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EU-South Korea Security Relations: The Current 
State of Play 
Mason Richey 
The EU and South Korea both face 
challenging circumstances in the domestic 
and international arenas. The EU is 
focused on Eurozone instability, terrorism, 
political extremism, revisionist Russia, and 
crises in the MENA. South Korea, under 
the new, center-left presidency of Moon 
Jae In, is fighting to emerge from political 
corruption, economic malaise, and the 
cloud of North Korea’s threats. Despite all 
this, the EU and South Korea are 
underappreciated international security 
partners. In this Security Policy Brief, 
Mason Richey discusses the strengths and 
weaknesses of EU-South Korea security 
cooperation, and identifies areas for 
continued strengthening of this 
partnership. 
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and turmoil in Europe’s neighbourhood. On 
the other hand, EU-SK security relations are 
influenced by unique, specific domestic 
political factors. On the European side, these 
include terrorism fears and (im)migration 
policy discord, various European crises 
(Eurozone instability, extremist political 
parties), and Brexit. On the SK side, concerns 
include inter-Korean relations (especially the 
North Korea (NK) threat) and political and 
economic aimlessness following twenty years 
of democratic and liberal capitalist 
development.  
 
Each of these factors incentivize certain 
cooperative behaviours between the EU and 
SK, while disincentivizing others. For instance, 
on the incentive side of the ledger, mid-sized 
Asian countries, such as SK, have become 
“middle powers” with resources and 
international influence sufficient to not only 
react to changes in the international system, 
but to also help sculpt it through cooperative 
endeavors, including with the EU. Meanwhile, 
Asia’s growth engine has called for a 
“European pivot”
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 to Asia, which includes not 
only trade agreements and support for and 
membership in multilateral fora (such as 
ASEM or the AIIB), but also strategic 
partnerships that can include political and 
security components, as is the case with SK. 
The 2016 EU Global Strategy outlines areas 
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Security relations between the EU and South 
Korea (SK) obviously do not take place in a 
vacuum. Numerous political realities condition 
the extent and depth of the two polities’ 
cooperation in traditional and non-traditional 
security domains. On the one hand, EU-SK 
security relations are nested within broader 
geopolitical contexts: the 21st century rise of 
Asia to global pre-eminence, the global and 
East Asian regional power competition 
between the US and China, the legacy and 
transformation of the US-led hub-and-spoke 
alliance system in East Asia, revisionist Russia, 
and turmoil in Europe’s neighborhood. On 
the other hand, EU-SK security relations are 
influenced by unique, specific domestic 
political factors. On the European side, these 
include terrorism fears and (im)migration 
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for Europe’s role in East Asia, particularly in 
domains such as international rule of law and 
the provision of maritime security and 
commons access (this includes everything 
from supporting an ASEAN-led regional 
security architecture, to exchange of expertise 
(e.g., through the European Defence College), 
to operational patrols with ASEAN countries, 
India, SK, Japan, and others).  
 
As for disincentives, aggressive Russian 
revisionism and instability in Europe’s 
southeastern and Mediterranean flanks have 
compelled the EU and its member states to 
retrench and focus foreign, security, and 
defence policy on areas of geographic 
proximity. To wit, the Korean peninsula is 
mentioned only twice in the sixty page EU 
Global Strategy. Numerous domestic political 
and economic factors—for both polities—also 
cloud EU-SK security cooperation: terrorism, 
(im)migration management, economic malaise, 
and political extremism (especially of the 
Euroskeptic flavour) have led the EU to 
inward-focused preoccupations, while 
domestic political scandal, anemic GDP 
growth, and NK’s menacing nuclear and 
missile programs have made it difficult for SK 
to see far beyond Northeast Asia. 
  
Lastly, some factors are ambiguous, both 
promoting and hindering EU-SK security 
cooperation. Brexit reduces EU capabilities, 
particularly in British strengths such as 
intelligence and diplomatic reach, maritime 
security, and expeditionary forces, all capacities 
Europe could use for out-of-area operations 
with East Asian partners. But the British have 
also been generally negative regarding greater 
EU foreign/security/defense policy 
(CFSP/CSDP) development; thus Brexit also 
allows the EU to deepen CFSP/CSDP 
integration, while necessitating a more 
comprehensive strategic vision that would 
enhance security cooperation with East Asian 
states such as SK.  
 
 
 Sino-US competition in East Asia and beyond 
is another factor with disparate effects on 
Europe’s relations with East Asian countries, 
including EU-SK security collaboration. On 
the one hand, the US and China are engaged in 
high-stakes, destabilizing geostrategic 
interactions along a range of hard security 
dimensions—South China Sea (SCS), NK, 
anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) in the 
western Pacific, etc.—that largely exclude 
(perhaps fortunately) EU involvement. On the 
other hand, the rivalry between the global 
superpower and the aspiring regional hegemon 
pushes most East Asian states to hedge 
between the great powers. This is especially 
true of SK, which is dependent on the US for 
security provision vis-à-vis NK, and over-
reliant on China for trade. It thus behooves SK 
to hedge its hedging behavior, i.e., to look 
beyond the US and China for other political, 
economic, diplomatic, and military partners, so 
as to lessen the possibility of being caught in a 
Sino-US vice. The EU is a natural choice in 
this regard.  
 
Finally, the US-led alliance system in East Asia, 
and especially the alliance with SK, exhibits 
powerful path dependency. The historically 
relatively exclusive nature of SK-US security 
and defense cooperation continues to inhibit 
other polities from deepening engagement with 
SK in this domain. Indeed the US resists 
interference with its foothold in mainland 
Northeast Asia, which serves both US interests 
in NK deterrence, and as a strategic location 
for checking China. For SK’s part, for various 
reasons it is cautious about diversifying its 
strategic security partners: (a) defense 
cooperation with the US requires materiel 
interoperability/integration, which works 
against SK’s military procurement from non-
US suppliers (an important aspect of 
international defense cooperation)
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; (b) SK is 
solicitous to not give the impression of 
downgrading the importance of the SK-US 
alliance, thus limiting its ability to work with 
other partners; (c) the SK government has 
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bandwidth limits, as maintaining full alliance 
commitments with the US while also 
increasing cooperation with other partners 
outstrips the country’s political, military, and 
economic resources. Yet the US is also 
interested in transforming the hub-and-spoke 
alliance system in East Asia into a networked 
model with increasing reliance on trilateral and 
quadrilateral arrangements. In this 
transformation there is room for the EU and 
NATO to play a greater security role both in 
East Asia and with East Asian partners (in the 
so-called “middle spaces”), including with SK.     
 
EU-SK SECURITY RELATIONS: THE 
STATE OF PLAY  
EU-SK security relations are anchored in a 
strategic partnership reflecting shared values 
and interests. SK is in fact the EU’s first 
partner to have signed all three agreements on 
political, trade, and security cooperation in 
EU-led crisis-management operations. The 
centerpiece of the strategic partnership is a 
Framework Agreement (2010) outlining rules 
of the road for EU-SK political dialogue and 
cooperation. The Framework Agreement is 
twinned by a 2011 Free Trade Agreement 
(KOR-EU FTA), the EU’s first and most 
comprehensive “next generation” FTA with an 
Asian country. The security dimension of the 
EU-SK strategic partnership is embodied in a 
Framework Participation Agreement (signed in 
2014) facilitating SK’s participation in CSDP 
missions and operations. This crisis 
management agreement was ratified by SK in 
December 2016, and, as such, it is the first and 
only East Asian state to have a formal security 
cooperation arrangement with the EU. 
 
Certainly this carries symbolic value as a down 
payment on the EU “pivot” to Asia, but, in 
addition, the crisis management agreement has 
already been put to use. Indeed, SK has carried 
out combined EU-SK missions within the 
larger Operation Atalanta effort combating 
piracy in the western Indian Ocean. This is a 
natural place for the EU and SK to work 
together, as the two polities have convergent 
free trade interests threatened in the region, are 
keen upholders of international law (against 
which piracy is a clear affront), and can 
collaborate under a larger UN mandate. 
 
That said, SK’s ability to engage more 
frequently and deeply in such CSDP missions 
is improbable in the near term. President Moon 
Jai In’s fledgling administration in Seoul is 
currently preoccupied by several critical issues 
on the Korean peninsula and in Northeast Asia 
more generally. The most well-known problem 
is NK, whose advancing nuclear weapons and 
missile programs are a direct threat to SK. 
Relations with China will also be a focus, as 
since 2016 the Middle Kingdom has 
economically punished Seoul’s decision to 
install a US-furnished THAAD
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 battery as a 
part of the SK-US alliance’s ballistic missile 
defense against NK. Meanwhile Donald 
Trump’s administration has vacillated on 
commitment to the alliance, calling into 
question the mutual defense treaty, burden-
sharing arrangements, and the South Korea-
United States Free Trade Agreement (KORUS 
FTA). Finally, under Moon’s new center-left 
administration, SK hopes to extricate itself 
from political scandal (following the 2016 
impeachment of conservative President Park 
Geun Hye) and economic anemia (with 
comparatively low 2016 GDP growth of 2.8%, 
and relatively high youth unemployment). 
Given these headwinds, there is little 
immediate appetite in SK for assuming 
additional responsibilities within the context of 
the crisis management agreement. 
 
However, if one takes a step back and 
examines EU-SK security relations in a larger 
context than CSDP, then security cooperation 
between Brussels and Seoul appears more 
vibrant. Indeed, the Framework Agreement 
 




lays out areas of cooperation between the 
signatories, including provisions on non-
/counter-proliferation of weapons of mass 
destruction (WMD), counter-terrorism, 
cyberthreats, money laundering and illicit 
trafficking, and promotion of human rights (and 
the international legal order more generally). Of 
special interest is burgeoning EU-SK 
cooperation on cyberthreats. This is 
institutionalized in the EU-SK Cyber Dialogue,
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an annual official-level meeting, ongoing since 
2013, for addressing cyberspace, internet 
governance, cybersecurity, cyber capacity 
building in third countries, and cybercrime. This 
is a natural and growing area of EU-SK security 
cooperation, given the fact that both the EU and 
SK are highly technically capable and face 
unique cyberthreats (Russia and NK). Especially 
noteworthy is that EU-SK cybersecurity 
cooperation vis-à-vis NK is also beneficial for 
Europe. Pyongyang’s elite cyberwarriors have 
successfully attacked European institutions 
including the UK NHS (in the 2017 WannaCry 
ransomware hack) and Polish banks, as well as 
unsuccessfully the ECB, Deutsche Bank 
locations in the US, and Czech banks. 
 
The EU’s contribution to SK’s security on the 
peninsula and in Northeast Asia more generally 
is broader and more sustained than might be 
expected. Obviously the US and China dominate 
the security and defense sectors of East Asia, 
and thus Europe is largely out in the cold (few 
major defense contracts with Japan and SK, no 
presence in the Asean Defense Ministers 
Meeting+, etc.), but both the EU and its 
member states make other important 
contributions to the maintenance of the East 
Asian order. First, they have a massive economic 
presence in East Asia, which, especially in light 
of the transatlantic alliance with the US, a true 
Pacific power, undergirds the norms of the 
current international/regional regime. Second, 
Europe actively maintains the 
international/regional system in terms of 
international law in a range of areas: non-
/counter-proliferation, human rights, counter-
terrorism, territorial/maritime dispute 
resolution, sanctions against NK, etc. Both of 
these sets of actions contribute indirectly to SK’s 
national security by promoting a stable regional 
system.   
 
Beyond that, the EU and its member states play 
an understated but meaningful role in countering 
Pyongyang’s weapons programs and other 
malfeasance, often in consultation with the 
international community and SK counterparts. 
Mostly visibly, perhaps, the EU vigorously 
enforces both standard international and 
enhanced voluntary sanctions against NK as a 
part of the effort—led by SK, Japan, and the 
US—to curb that country’s WMD (especially 
nuclear) and missile development. In February 
2017 the EU imposed new sanctions—
implementing a November 2016 UNSC 
resolution—for Pyongyang’s nuclear and 
ballistic missile tests.
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  These sanctions cover 
trade in coal, iron and iron ore, and imports 
from NK of copper, nickel, silver, and zinc. 
New sales of helicopters and ships were banned 
under the new sanctions, tighter controls on the 
finance and transport sectors were introduced, 
and educational, training, and scientific 
exchanges were prohibited if they could benefit 
NK’s nuclear and/or ballistic missile programs. 
NK’s use of real estate property on EU territory 
was also restricted, as was the right of NK 
diplomats to have more than one bank account 
in the EU.
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 More recently, in April 2017, the EU 
expanded the sanctions regime again, prohibiting 
European companies from investing in any NK 
industry connected with conventional 
armaments, including metallurgy, aviation, 
information technology, chemicals, mining, and 
refining. The same measure increased to 41 and 
11 respectively the number of sanctioned 
individuals (with travel bans and asset freezes) 
and institutions with connections to NK’s 



































Such measures by the EU not only contribute to 
SK’s security—and are often calibrated and 
executed in coordination with Seoul—but also 
are important to the interests of the EU and its 
member states. NK is a known proliferator of 
WMD (including nuclear technology) to states in 
the Middle East. For example, it has been 
recently revealed that NK attempted to sell 
lithium-6—a material for increasing nuclear 
explosive yield—to unknown, black-market 
buyers in 2016.
7
 Even more notoriously, 
Pyongyang almost certainly ordered the 
assassination by VX of Kim Jong Nam in the 
Kuala Lumpur airport in early 2017. While not 
proliferation in the typical sense, a side-effect of 
the assassination was that it served as a message 
to the international community that Pyongyang 
is willing to employ chemical weapons to 
achieve its objectives. As a proliferator of WMD 
to the Middle East, a volatile region with both 
governments and terrorist organizations hostile 
to the EU and its member states, NK’s WMD 
and missile programs represent a threat to 
European security.  
 
The EU (with Japan) has co-sponsored UN 
resolutions targeting NK’s human rights abuses, 
while Poland (although not Malta) has stopped 
accepting North Korean visa applications for 
seconded laborers (whose hard currency 
earnings go to pay for Pyongyang’s nuclear and 
missile programs). As of July 2015 the European 
Commission has also designated (for asset freeze 
and operation suspension) the North Korean 
insurance company KNIC (Korea National 
Insurance Corporation) as an entity violating 
Council Regulation (EC) 329/2007. This 
insurance company, linked to Pyongyang’s 
Office 39, was responsible for committing 
insurance/re-insurance fraud as a way of earning 
hundreds of millions of dollars in hard currency 
that was sent directly into NK’s funds for its 
nuclear and missile/rocket programs. Germany 
closed a KNIC branch in 2015, freezing the 
assets of four Hamburg-based managers, while 
the UK did the same thing in October 2016 for 
the KNIC’s London headquarters.8   
Lastly, the UK and France both store/reprocess 
and transport (to the US) for reprocessing used 
plutonium from SK and Japanese civilian 
nuclear reactors. This task reduces these 
countries’ available nuclear fuel (were they to 
“go nuclear” in response to the NK nuclear 
threat). As importantly, these actions are an 
essential part of the nuclear cooperation 
agreements that undergird the NPT. 
 
EU-SK SECURITY RELATIONS: PATHS 
AHEAD 
The EU and its member states have extensive, 
meaningful, ongoing security relations with SK, 
and certainly contribute to security in East Asia 
more broadly. In fact they are strong on 
international rule of law issues and general 
support for the regimes and institutions that 
have buttressed the peace and prosperity of SK 
and East Asia in the post-WWII/post-Cold War 
period. Currently the mantra emanating from the 
EU’s External Action Service is that the more 
Asian countries support the EU’s security 
challenges, the more the EU is likely to 
reciprocate. One imagines Seoul feels likewise. 
Going forward, however, many of the challenges 
facing Europe and SK, as outlined above, will, 
absent pollyannish visions of dramatic 
improvement, diminish both side’s overall 
power, in turn diminishing the force they can 
bring to bear in responding to each other’s 
security concerns in the face of non-state/non-
conventional threats and/or potential 
destabilizing state revisionism (e.g., by NK, 
China, or Russia).  
 
In this regard, SK’s biggest short/medium term 
difficulty is NK. Pyongyang’s capabilities and 
threatening posture make it difficult for Seoul to 
look far afield in applying scarce assets to crisis 
management. That said, President Moon is a 
reformer, and some of his plans may open 
opportunities for greater EU-SK security 
cooperation. In the long term, SK’s biggest 
challenge is actually domestic, as politico-
economic corruption and recent scandals have 
                        






























exposed serious, intractable shortcomings in 
SK’s leading institutions. Moreover, the country 
is facing a demographic crunch and the 
imperative of adapting to new forms of 
creativity-driven globalization that are not 
amenable to SK’s economic strengths (the 
optimization of industrial production processes 
invented elsewhere).   
 
For Europe, the big obstacle to greater 
contribution to East Asian security and order, 
including in partnership with SK, is Europe’s 
relationship to China. The EU and its member 
states have been reluctant to use economic 
firepower vis-à-vis China to pressure Beijing to 
refrain from destabilizing actions in East Asia 
(particularly in the South and East China Seas), 
or to persuade it to adopt a harder line vis-à-vis 
NK. Indeed European leaders’ visits to China 
are judged primarily by the business deals signed 
in front of cameras broadcasting the good 
economic news back to beleaguered industries in 
Europe. Europe’s weakened condition going 
forward will incentivize it to play an even 
meeker role vis-à-vis China’s revisionism. This 
point is really just an instance of a larger issue: 
Europe has the economic, diplomatic, and soft 
power to intervene selectively (and in concert 
with the US, the international community, and 
the EU’s strategic partners such as SK, Japan, 
China, and India) in East Asian security issues, 














Were that fact to change, there are opportunities 
for Europe to contribute to security and order in 
East Asia in general and SK in particular. 
Transatlantic security cooperation in Asia would 
top the list. The US and Europe would be well 
advised to link Atlantic and Pacific security 
networks and create patterns of cooperation 
between, for example, NATO and countries 
such as SK, Japan, and Australia (this would 
involve diplomatic handholding with China, 
which makes it unlikely). There is also 
opportunity (and necessity) for establishing 
better space and cybersecurity cooperation 
between Europe and East Asian countries, 
especially SK. Finally, to select one area among 
several, the EU could contribute to the slowing 
of the NK nuclear program by sanctioning 
banks and financial institutions that have any 
role in linking NK’s foreign exchange activities 
to the country’s nuclear and missile/rocket 
programs (so-called secondary financial 
sanctions). If this were done in concert with the 
US, it would be a major hit to the regime. China 
would be unhappy, but that would be precisely 
because the impact would be real.  
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